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Abstract 
This article presents an econometric analysis of the wage share in seven emerging economies. 
We focus on the effect of globalisation, captured by participation in global value chains and 
financial integration, indicators of bargaining power of labour and technological change on the 
wage share. We use input-output tables that allow us to obtain detailed measures of global 
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workers and within manufacturing and service industries. We find a negative effect of offshoring 
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findings suggest that the transmission mechanism is a reduction in labours’ bargaining power 
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evidence of a negative effect of technological change. 
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1. Introduction  
The share of wages in GDP has declined in both developed and developing countries since the 
1980s. While there has been a growing body of recent research on the causes of the decline in 
the wage share in the advanced economies, analyses of the dynamics of the wage share in 
emerging economies are scarce. Moreover, the existing literature is based on aggregate country 
level data or pooled analysis of both developed and developing countries, and does not provide 
a specific analysis relevant to the context of the emerging economies. This article presents an 
econometric analysis of the determinants of the wage share using sectoral data for emerging 
economies.  
Previous research has highlighted the impact of technological change, globalisation, 
changes in government policy, and labour market institutions to explain the decline in the wage 
share (Stockhammer, 2016; IMF, 2017; Jayadev, 2007; Harrison, 2002; Diwan, 2001). Since 
many of those factors are either determined at a sectoral level or have developed differently 
across sectors, a sector level analysis has advantages over previous research that uses country-
level data. Furthermore, it allows to focus on the decline in the within sector wage share which 
was the main driver of the trend of increasing inequality in functional income distribution (IMF, 
2017; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014).  
We identify three channels via which global value chains, defined as the offshoring of 
tasks from the advanced to the emerging economies, can negatively affect the wage share. The 
first channel suggests that integration into global value chains increases capital intensity of 
production in the emerging economies, as offshored tasks are likely to be more capital intensive 
than domestic tasks in capital scarce countries. The second implies that offshoring leads to a 
change in the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Through the third channel, 
global value chains can alter the bargaining power between labour and capital, by changing the 
degree of international competition in the product market, by providing efficiency gains that 
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might not necessarily be equally shared between capital and labour, and/or by increasing the 
fall-back options of capital.  
We test these hypotheses econometrically using a sector-level dataset for seven 
emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey) for the 
period of 1995- 2009, which allows us to differentiate results by high-, medium-, and low-
skilled workers within manufacturing and service industries. International input-output tables, 
which were not fully exploited in the previous research, allow us to obtain detailed measures 
of participation in the global value chain. Another novelty of the article is a detailed analysis 
of the impact of direct and indirect measures of the bargaining power of labour on the wage 
share in the context of emerging economies, as well as an account of the role of technological 
change. Furthermore, we use a dynamic panel data estimation method that takes the 
endogeneity of our explanatory variables into account.  
Our results cast doubt on the first two channels, while we find evidence for a negative 
impact of globalisation on the bargaining power of labour in emerging economies. This 
suggests that the decline in the wage share is not an inevitable outcome of trade integration, 
but can be altered by institutions for a level playing field. This is especially relevant for 
countries pursuing export orientated growth strategies.  
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature with an aim to pin down the effects of globalisation in 
general, and global value chain integration in particular, on functional income distribution, as 
well as the impact of measures of bargaining power and technological change. Section 3 
presents our data, estimation methodology and specifications. Section 4 introduces the stylised 
facts of our sample. Section 5 presents the estimation results and section 6 concludes.  
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2. Determinants of the wage share  
2.1 The effect of globalisation on the wage share 
Traditional trade theory based on the Heckscher-Ohlin – Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts 
that in a labour abundant country, trade liberalisation would lead to an increase in the return to 
labour relative to capital. Likewise, capital account openness can reduce the relative price of 
capital in capital-scarce countries (IMF, 2017). If the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labour is lower than one, the wage share will increase in the relatively more labour 
abundant emerging economies. In contrast, according to new trade theories trade can provide 
the recipient country with new technologies, and lead to trade-induced technological change. 
This will have a negative effect on the wage share for a given capital-output ratio if 
technological change is capital augmenting and the elasticity of substitution between labour 
and capital is larger than one; if it is below one, the effect will be positive (Bentolila & Saint-
Paul, 2003). 
More recent contributions discuss the effect of globalisation in the context of intra-
industry offshoring and foreign direct investment (FDI) via the creation of global value chains 
(Feenstra & Hanson, 1997; Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Two arguments prevail in the 
recent literature: Firstly, firms in capital abundant countries will offshore labour intensive tasks 
to benefit from lower wages in labour abundant countries (IMF, 2017). This implies an increase 
in capital intensity in advanced economies and a decline in capital intensity in emerging and 
developing countries. If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is higher than 
one in advanced countries, while it is lower than one in the rest of the world, this process is 
expected to lead to declining labour shares worldwide. Elsby, et al. (2013) suggest that even if 
the elasticity of substitution is above one in all countries, offshored tasks can be considered 
capital intensive in emerging economies, even though they are relatively labour intensive in 
advanced countries. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) suggest that offshoring increases wages for 
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high-skilled workers worldwide, since tasks that are considered low-skill intensive in advanced 
countries are high-skill intensive in emerging economies. However, again the overall effect on 
the wage share depends on the elasticities of substitution. Consequently, the mechanisms 
discussed so far rely on specific assumptions about the values of two parameters: if the 
elasticity of substitution is below (above) one in emerging economies, and offshored tasks are 
relatively capital (labour) intensive, the wage share will rise. Importantly for our empirical 
analysis, according to the hypothesis discussed above, the effect of globalisation on the wage 
share is enacted through a change in the relative quantities of capital and labour. 
The second argument, put forward by the IMF (2017), is that in the context of declining 
prices of capital relative to labour (due to technological change), the tasks most likely to be 
offshored are those with a relatively low elasticity of substitution as capital will simply be 
substituted for labour in tasks with a high elasticity. This does not necessarily imply a change 
in capital intensity – rather, the share of tasks with overall low elasticity of substitution 
increases, which can depress the wage share in the emerging host economies. However, this 
mechanism relies on the additional assumption that offshored tasks do not have a higher labour 
share than the average task in the host country, due to factors other than the elasticity of 
substitution (for example due to a different distribution parameter in the production function).1 
If this hypothesis holds, we should expect a change in the elasticity of substitution in the 
emerging economies, especially in sectors that are hosts of offshoring from the advanced 
economies.  
                                                 
1 The argument can be rationalised by differentiating the labour share derived from a constant elasticity of 
substitution production function (Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003) with respect to the elasticity of substitution:  
𝜕𝑊𝑆
𝜕𝜌
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𝑌
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Where Y and K stands for output and capital; A is capital augmenting technological change; 𝑏 is the ‘distribution 
parameter’ and 𝜌 is positively related to the elasticity of substitution. Since the derive is positive, a decline in 𝜌 
will decrease the wage share. 
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Additionally, globalisation in general and integration into global value chains in 
particular can change the relative bargaining power between labour and capital. We identify 
three possible mechanisms. First, the political economy approach emphasises the asymmetry 
between the fall-back options of capital vis-à-vis labour due to the increase in the mobility of 
capital and the increase in the elasticity of labour demand (Onaran, 2009; Harrison, 2002; 
Rodrik, 1998). On the one hand, this creates a threat effect by capital to relocate or outsource. 
On the other hand, countries compete via wage moderation in order to guarantee their 
attractiveness as destinations for relocation, which may create a race to the bottom in the wage 
share (Burke and Epstein, 2001). Second, trade openness can increase the competitive pressure 
on firms. This is more likely to take place in the case of trade in intermediate goods, where 
there are established mechanisms for bidding for low cost of production between the alternative 
firms which are part of the global value chain of a multinational corporation (Anner, et al., 
2005). While this could lead to a reduction in the mark-up and thus increase the wage share, 
the pressure on the mark-up may also make firms less accommodating in terms of wage 
demands of workers. If profits are squeezed due to competition, capital could attempt to 
recuperate their share by reducing labour costs. However, trade in the last decades has often 
taken the form of vertical integration of multinational corporations, thereby leading to 
increased concentration rather than increased competition.2 Reduced competition allows firms 
to charge a higher mark-up on costs, which will decrease the wage share (Joskow, 2008). Third, 
even if competition is unaltered – the emergence of global value chains has created efficiency 
gains and opened new opportunities for exploiting differences in labour costs and markets 
across countries. However, the distribution of these gains depends on the relative bargaining 
power of capital and labour.  
                                                 
2 Intra-firm exports make up one third of global exports in 2015. For the USA, where data availability is best, 
around half of all imports from emerging economies and developing countries are intra-firm transactions (Lakatos 
& Ohnsorge, 2017).  
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Summing up, we distinguished three channels via which global value chains can 
negatively affect the wage share. The first implies an increase in capital intensity and should 
therefore be reflected in the capital-output ratio. The second implies a change in the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labour over time, i.e. a declining elasticity as global value 
chains take hold. Lastly, globalisation can alter the bargaining power between labour and 
capital by putting downward pressure on wages, changing the degree of competition, or 
creating efficiency gains, which may not be passed on to labour. The driver for offshoring is 
differences in labour costs, which implies the need to distinguish between offshoring coming 
from advanced versus other emerging economies. 
 
Several empirical studies find substantial negative effects of variables measuring trade intensity 
(imports plus exports as a ratio to GDP) and FDI on the wage share (Doan & Wan, 2017; 
Stockhammer, 2016; Onaran, 2009; Harrison, 2002; Jayadev, 2007). Research using sector 
level data for emerging economies is scarce. IMF (2017) includes emerging and advanced 
countries in their sector level estimations, but they do not provide estimations for emerging 
economies only. They find negative effects of trade linkages, a measure related to offshoring, 
for tradable sectors. Furthermore, their country level estimations, also for a pool of advanced 
and emerging economies, indicate that global value chain integration is the strongest driver of 
the decline of the wage share in emerging economies. IMF (2017) does not find a significant 
effect of financial globalisation for the sector level estimation, although there is evidence for a 
positive effect in their country-level estimations for emerging economies. Interestingly, IMF 
(2017) interpret their findings as the impact of a decreasing relative price of capital, which is 
difficult to reconcile with the fact that the relative price of capital is controlled for in their 
model. This suggests that they are more likely to pick up a bargaining effect.  
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Globalisation in general, and deregulation of international capital flows in particular, 
has also been followed by currency crises. Diwan (2001) has highlighted how the wage share 
is negatively affected by banking and exchange rate crises, indicating that labour is forced to 
bear most of the costs. Blecker (2012) argues that an increase in the cost of intermediate inputs, 
for example due to a currency depreciation, induces a bargaining process between capital and 
labour. As each party try to shift the additional costs onto the other party, inflation increases. 
The impact on the wage share is ambiguous and depends on the relative bargaining power of 
capital and labour. There is also evidence for a hysteresis effect after the currency crisis, 
indicating that the wage share might remain at a lower level for years (Diwan, 2001; Onaran, 
2009).  
 
2.2 Bargaining power and technological change 
Different economic schools of thought have distinct starting points for their analysis of functional 
income distribution. Contributions in the tradition of New Classical and New Keynesian 
Economics base their analysis on a production function framework, with optimising firms that 
apply marginalist pricing, so that distribution is determined by technological parameters like the 
factor elasticity of output (Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003). However, in imperfect goods- and labour 
markets, bargaining power and mark-up are shift parameters that can impact the wage share. 
Economists working in the tradition of Political Economy3 usually reject the existence of 
continuous and differentiable production functions and start from the assumption of imperfectly 
competitive markets where firms apply a variant of mark-up pricing (Lavoie, 2014:47-64). The 
mark-up, in turn, determines income distribution. However, despite different theoretical starting 
points, both literature streams arrive at a bargaining framework to analyse the distribution of 
income.  
                                                 
3 In the following, we refer to the Marxist, Institutionalist and post-Keynesian/Kaleckian analysis as the Political 
Economy approach. 
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Measures of bargaining power can be categorised into direct and indirect factors. Direct 
factors strengthen workers’ voice in negotiations, whereas indirect factors improve their fall-
back options in case negotiations break down. Several empirical articles have confirmed an 
impact of direct measures of bargaining power, such as strike activity, collective bargaining 
arrangements and minimum wages, on the wage share (ILO, 2011; Kristal, 2010; EC, 2007; 
Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003). Union density is the most commonly used variable with the best 
data availability and the most robust positive effect on the wage share in country level 
estimations of advanced countries (Stockhammer, 2016). Nevertheless, the actual effect of 
unions may be underestimated in empirical studies since collective bargaining coverage greatly 
exceeds union membership in some countries (Visser, 2006). IMF (2017) find no significant 
effect of union density in most specifications.  
Welfare state retrenchment is found to be an important determinant of the fall in the 
wage share, suggesting that labours’ position improves if they can rely on the fall-back option 
of a social wage to meet their basic needs in case of losing their job (Stockhammer, 2016; 
Onaran, 2009; Jayadev, 2007; Harrison, 2002).   
The effect of variables measuring the strictness of product and labour market 
regulations are mixed and not robust in the case of advanced economies (Stockhammer, 2016; 
EC, 2007; IMF 2007).  
Additionally, inequality in personal income distribution can have a negative impact on 
functional income distribution. There is some research on the effects of changes in the wage 
share on personal inequality (Daudey & Garcia-Penalosa, 2007) but not on the effects of the 
latter on the wage share. The increase in personal inequality affects the command over 
resources and power relations. Increasing economic and political power in the hands of a small 
elite allows them what Stiglitz (2012) calls ‘regulatory capture’ – i.e. to limit redistribution as 
well as to shape the rules in areas ranging from corporate governance to product and labour 
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market regulation in their interest. Consequently, we would expect a negative effect of personal 
distribution on the wage share. 
 
Recent literature emphasises how technological progress in the last decades was driven by 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT), that allowed to replace workers by 
machines for tasks that are easily automatized (IMF, 2017) and contributed to a decline in the 
price of capital relative to labour which led to an increase in the capital-output ratio 
(Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014). The New Keynesian framework expects a negative 
(positive) effect of technological progress or an increase in the capital-output ratio on the wage 
share if capital acts as a gross substitute (complement) for labour. Again, here the result 
depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour: a rise in capital intensity 
leads to a lower wage share if the elasticity is larger than one. It is usually assumed that capital 
is a substitute for unskilled labour, whereas it complements skilled workers. Theories in the 
tradition of Political Economy also consider a negative impact of the capital-output ratio on the 
wage share. If firms have a profit rate target, an increase in the capital stock will be associated 
with a higher mark-up to increase profits and keep the profit rate constant (Lavoie, 2014:162-
163). However, this negative relation between the capital-output ratio and the wage share is 
independent of substitution effects between capital and labour. Technological change, e.g. an 
increase in labour productivity, will reduce the wage share if workers are not able to enforce a 
wage rise that is in line with the productivity increase (Bhaduri, 2006). Furthermore, if 
technological change facilitates replacement of workers by machines, this increases the 
credibility of the firing threat and thereby reduces labour’s bargaining power. Therefore, the 
Political Economy approach also considers a social effect of technological change (Marglin, 
1974), however does not necessarily imply a skill bias. This interpretation stands in stark 
contrast to the New Keynesian framework discussed above where the effect of changes in 
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productivity will depend on the elasticity of substitution, and is therefore independent of 
workers’ bargaining power. 
There are only a few studies on emerging economies who include measures of 
technological change in empirical analyses of the wage share, due to lack of internationally 
comparable data prior to the release of the WIOD database. Harrison (2002) finds an elasticity 
of substitution smaller than one in a panel of emerging economies and developing countries, 
while Doan and Wan (2017) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) find an elasticity larger 
than one, although the latter article does not differentiate between emerging and advanced 
economies. IMF (2017) fail to find a significant effect of the relative price of capital on the 
wage share for tradable sectors, while there is some evidence for a negative effect in non-
tradable sectors, however, they also pool advanced and emerging economies. Summing up, 
evidence for an elasticity of substitution higher than one, and thereby for a negative effect of 
technological change in emerging economies, is mixed, and analysis at the sector level are 
scarce and do not differentiate between emerging and advanced economies.  
Empirically, most studies use aggregate country level panel data, which does not allow 
to differentiate the results across skill groups and industries. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) 
and IMF (2017) use sectoral as well as country panel data; however, they pool advanced and 
emerging economies and do not distinguish their offshoring measure by country of origin.  
 
3. Empirical model and methodology   
We estimate a general model that controls for the effect of globalisation, bargaining power and 
technological change on the wage share. Our baseline specification takes the following form:  
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𝑊𝑆𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑊𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝐶𝐼ln⁡(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿⁡𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌)𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛼𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝐵𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 (1)
  
WS is the adjusted wage share in sector i of country c, which is measured as labour 
compensation as a ratio to value added adjusted for the labour income of the self-employed, 
imputed based on the assumption that their hourly labour income is equal to the average hourly 
labour income of the employees in the sector.4 Furthermore, we estimate separate specifications 
for the share of the labour compensation of high-, medium- and low-skilled workers in sectoral 
value added. Low-, medium- and high-skilled refers to workers with primary, secondary and 
tertiary education, respectively (Timmer, et al., 2015). Variable definitions and data sources 
are listed in table A1 in the appendix. 
CAPITAL INTENSITY, our main proxy for the substitution of labour with capital, is 
measured as the logarithm of total capital stock as a ratio to value added. Under the assumption 
of optimising firms, the variable will capture changes in relative prices of capital and labour, 
induced either by globalisation or technological change. Consequently, we expect a negative 
(positive) effect of CAPITAL INTENSITY on the wage share if the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour is larger (smaller) than one. It would be desirable to include a 
measure of capital augmenting technological change, as, in contrast to labour-augmenting 
technological change, it can affect the wage share for a given capital-output ratio. However, 
(imperfect) proxies like total factor productivity or the ICT capital stock are not available for 
our sample. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) provide evidence that the potential bias 
                                                 
4 We use a sector-level dataset for 7 emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, 
and Turkey) based on the WIOD database for the period of 1995- 2009. The choice of countries and time period 
is determined by the availability of data. Where the wage share was constant for several years in a row (indicating 
extrapolation of data by the providers of the database) and where data from the WORLD KLEMS database was 
available (e.g. for Korea) we extrapolate through splicing. More precisely, we link the wage share from WIOD 
with the growth rate of the adjusted wage share from KLEMS. The series have correlations of 0.9 and above. We 
exclude outlier sectors where the percentage change in the wage share exceeds 50% in one year. This is the case 
in two manufacturing and one service sector in Brazil and Turkey respectively, i.e. six sectors in total.  
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resulting from the omission this variable is negligible. Similarly, in Section 5 we argue that we 
see little reason for concern in our estimations. 
Furthermore, we include GROWTH, measured as the logarithmic change in value 
added, to account for the counter-cyclicality of the wage share (Kalecki, 1954). 
As suggested by the literature on global value chains, we are mainly interested in the 
effect of offshoring of tasks from advanced countries on the wage share in emerging 
economies. Therefore, in the baseline specification we capture the effect of GLOBALISATION 
by intra-industry intermediate exports (by supplying sector), based on the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD; Timmer, et al., 2015). Furthermore, we differentiate exports by destination 
based on two country groups defined as ‘high-wage’ countries (Australia, Canada, Europe, 
Japan, Russia, and the USA), and ‘low-wage countries’ (including countries in our sample, 
Taiwan, and the rest of the world). In alternative specifications, we also control for the impact 
of total exports at the sector level as a broad measure of trade openness. We also estimate the 
impact of inward and outward FDI, offshoring (defined as inter-industry intermediate imports 
by using sector), and final imports by supplying sector at the sector level. Additionally, we test 
the impact of financial globalisation measured by non-FDI and total foreign assets and 
liabilities at the country level.  
𝐵𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺 is a group of variables related to industrial relations and labour market 
institutions which include union density at the country level (Visser, 2015). In alternative 
specifications, we also test for the impact of country-level minimum wages as a ratio to sectoral 
average labour compensation per employee, government spending and an index of labour 
market institutions at the country level. An increase in any of the bargaining measures is 
expected to have a positive impact on the wage share, given that potential negative effects of 
an increase in wages on employment should be captured by the capital-output ratio.  
13 
Given that technological change is likely to be a function of past or current values of 
the wage share, we have to take potential endogeneity into account (Acemoglu, 2003; Hein, 
2014). Similarly, sectors with relatively lower wage shares might be the target of offshoring, 
thereby leading to a negative effect of a higher wage share on exports. The bias arising when 
ignoring this problem of endogeneity in estimations using the within estimator will be opposite 
to the direction of the reverse causality (Wooldridge, 2002). Indeed, this could explain the 
finding of high and significant negative effects of technological change on the wage share in 
previous contributions, which do not properly account for endogeneity (Doan & Wan, 2017; 
Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014). The effect of globalisation could be understated for the same 
reason. Accounting for reverse causality in a dynamic model requires the use of instrumental 
variables. We use the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator introduced by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) because it provides readily available ‘internal’ instruments based on lagged 
values of the explanatory variables.  
We adopt an estimation strategy that starts with the most general specification and the 
most robust estimator (one-step difference GMM) and work our way toward the most 
parsimonious model with the most efficient estimator (two-step difference GMM with standard 
errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and Windmeijer (2005) small sample error correction), 
following Kiviet, et al. (2015).5 We start with the estimation of a fairly unrestricted 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag model including the contemporaneous and lagged value of all 
explanatory variables and the first and second lag of the dependent variable. All estimations 
include year dummies to account for unobserved shocks and mitigate cross-sectional 
dependence. Due to the relatively small number of cross sections, we restrict our instrument 
                                                 
5 We also experimented with the system GMM estimator which includes additional moment conditions that can 
be applied to the model estimated in level instead of differences. We obtain a very low Hansen test which is driven 
by the instruments for the level equation, as can be deducted from the incremental Sargan test on this group of 
instruments. This speaks against the validity of the ‘stationarity assumption’ and thereby renders this estimation 
method unreliable. Put differently, it confirms our choice of difference GMM as the main estimation method. 
Results are available upon request. 
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set with the fifth lag (starting from the second lag for the endogenous variables) and one 
instrument column per variable (‘collapsed’ instrument set). We treat all variables, except 
union density, as endogenous. Subsequently, for each specification, we perform a ‘testing 
down’ procedure by dropping variables with the lowest p-value, until we are left with at least 
one measure per variable. 6  
We exclude the following sectors from all estimations: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Coke and Refined Petroleum, as well as mostly publicly 
owned sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; 
Human Health and Social Work Activities). This is because the wage setting behaviour in these 
industries may not be determined by the same forces as other sectors. For example, publicly 
owned not-for-profit companies will typically have a wage share of 100%, while value added 
in Agriculture and Mining will fluctuate with changes in commodity prices. Furthermore, we 
exclude the real estate sector whose value added largely constitutes imputed rents (Timmer, et 
al., 2007). Table A2 in the appendix presents the list of sectors. 
 
4. Stylised facts 
The country level wage share declined in all countries in our sample between 1995 and 2007 
apart from Brazil. It is interesting that the wage share in Brazil also appears to decline until 
2003, a year which marks a radical policy shift to the Workers’ Party. The newly elected party 
pursued a strong expansion of the welfare state, including an increase in the minimum wage 
and anti-poverty public spending programmes like Bolsa Família. Interestingly, the political 
                                                 
6 As any other estimator, the GMM estimator is based on the assumption that we have no omitted time-varying 
variable that is correlated with the wage share and any of our covariates. For this reason, it is important to account 
for a lagged dependent variable as well as to start the estimations based on a general model that allows for several 
lags of the explanatory variables. Additionally, given that we cannot exclude the possibility that we omit some 
important covariates, such as a measure of capital-augmenting technological change, the use of the GMM 
estimator mitigates potential endogeneity (and therefore bias) of our explanatory variables, as long as the 
correlation between these omitted factors and our explanatory variables is only contemporaneous. 
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context in which policies like minimum wage increases are implemented, seem to matter in 
terms of the impact on the wage share. For example, Turkey also experienced a substantial 
increase in the minimum wage during the same period under the conservative government of 
Justice and Development Party, which was, however, accompanied by a decline in the wage 
share.  
While the observed decline in the aggregate country-level labour share is a well-
documented fact, there is only limited analysis at the sectoral level. We find that the trend 
observed in the aggregate country level wage share is mirrored at the sectoral level, albeit with 
differences between manufacturing and services sectors as well as high (HS) and low skilled 
(LS) sector groups and across countries as can be seen in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1: Wage share by sector groups 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD. The graph for the total wage share includes all sectors. Sector level 
graphs exclude: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying; Coke and Refined 
Petroleum; Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and 
Social Work Activities and Real Estate. HS and LS stands for high and low skilled sectors respectively.     
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Despite the diversity of the wage share dynamics across countries and sectors, the wage share 
declined in the majority (56%) of sectors. Moreover, 86.1% of those sectors, where the wage 
share decreased, experienced a decline of more than 3% percent between 1995 and 2007. This 
confirms previous findings that attribute the decline of the country-level wage share to a decline 
of the wage share within sectors (IMF, 2017; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014). The wage share 
declined most strongly and consistently in high-skilled manufacturing sectors like Chemicals 
and Chemical Products and Machinery and Equipment as well as low-skilled sectors like Basic 
Metals and Fabricated Metal. There is also evidence of a decline in service sectors like Renting 
of Machinery and Equipment and Other Business Activities and Financial Intermediation. The 
latter may be related to the effects of currency crises and privatization in the banking industry 
in the emerging economies.  
Next, Figure 2 presents the wage share of high-, medium- and low-skilled workers (as 
defined by their level of education) in value added of the sector, where we observe a stronger 
skill bias.  
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Figure 2: Wage share by skill group as defined by workers’ education 
 
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD. 
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While the share of high skilled workers’ wage bill in total value added increased in some 
countries, the picture is dominated by declining wage shares of both medium and low skilled 
workers. Importantly, a decline in the wage share of workers as defined by their education may 
reflect losing out with respect to capital, workers of another skill group or a change in the 
educational composition of the workforce. One advantage of using this data to distinguish 
different effects across skill-groups over estimations for groups of high- and low-skilled sectors 
(e.g. as in IMF, 2007) is that it does not require the restrictive assumption that the wage share 
in the low-skilled sectors reflects predominantly the share of low-skilled workers in those 
sectors.   
Variables accounting for globalisation show similar patterns across all countries. Intra-
industry intermediate exports and offshoring increased in all countries in both high and low 
skilled manufacturing sectors. There is also evidence for a positive trend in service sectors, 
especially those categorised as high-skilled, although the magnitudes are generally much lower 
than in manufacturing. The years of the Great Recession are the only exception to this otherwise 
increasing trend, which resumed in 2010 in all countries.  
We observe slightly increasing or stagnating capital-output ratios in manufacturing 
sectors across most countries. Exceptions are Korea and China, where capital intensity 
declined.  
Union density declined in Korea, Mexico, Turkey, India and China, while it followed 
an inverted U-shape pattern in Indonesia and increased in Brazil. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
As emerging markets are usually the destination of offshoring, we start our analysis by focusing 
on the impact of intra-industry intermediate exports, which corresponds to the origin of 
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intermediate imports (offshoring) to the advanced countries. Table 1 reports the estimation 
results.  
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Table 1: The effect of intra-industry intermediate exports on the wage share 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sector group Total Manu Services Manu Total Manu Manu Manu 
Skill group All All All All All HS MS LS 
growth -0.200 -0.125 0.208 -0.115 -0.153 -0.017 -0.006 -0.044*  
(0.213) (0.353) (0.248) (0.164) (0.122) (0.419) (0.721) (0.050) 
Capital_Intensity   0.569**      
   (0.016)      
Capital_Intensity_(t-1) 0.008 0.039 -0.461** 0.029 -0.022 0.035** -0.002 -0.033  
(0.856) (0.412) (0.033) (0.562) (0.573) (0.022) (0.927) (0.217) 
exports_LW -0.214  2.902  -0.303     
(0.771)  (0.677)  (0.603)    
exports_LW_(t-1)  -0.492  -0.071  -0.017 0.162 -0.174  
 (0.359)  (0.921)  (0.956) (0.445) (0.639) 
exports_HW   -6.308 -0.888     
   (0.193) (0.290)     
exports_HW_(t-1) -0.827** -0.562*   -0.483 -0.453** -0.309* 0.505  
(0.044) (0.085)   (0.272) (0.026) (0.077) (0.217) 
union_density_(t-1) 0.297*** 0.200** 0.213 0.184** 0.257*** 0.074** 0.101* 0.053  
(0.008) (0.034) (0.122) (0.044) (0.007) (0.018) (0.089) (0.434) 
Capital_intensity 
*exports_(t-1)    -0.232     
    (0.299)     
Wage_Share_(t-1) 0.602*** 0.442* 0.964*** 0.472** 0.778***     
(0.003) (0.076) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000)    
Wage_Share_(t-2) 0.083 0.036  0.023 0.062     
(0.324) (0.675)  (0.803) (0.357)    
Wage_Share_HS_(t-1)      0.918***    
     (0.000)   
Wage_Share_MS_(t-1)       0.740***   
      (0.000)  
Wage_Share_LS_(t-1)        0.744***  
       (0.000) 
Hansen_pval 0.033 0.117 0.877 0.235 0.060 0.017 0.002 0.001 
AR1_pval 0.001 0.037 0.003 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 
AR2_pval 0.999 0.315 0.410 0.202 0.597 0.194 0.139 0.981 
Instruments 31 31 32 35 33 32 32 32 
Sectors 141 89 52 89 141 89 89 89 
F-test 10.522 6.032 10.986 7.722 13.614 31.461 15.859 29.249 
Observations 1227 777 481 777 1439 827 827 827 
Period 98-07 98-07 97-07 98-07 98-09 97-07 97-07 97-07 
Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ with 
one instrument column per variable. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hansen_pval is the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. 
Sectors, F-test and Observations are the number of cross sections, the F-test statistic and the number of 
observations. 
 
Specification (1) presents the results for the pool of manufacturing and service sectors, and is 
estimated for the period 1998-2007, excluding the years after the Great Recession.7 We find a 
                                                 
7 The years 1995-97 drop out due to the inclusion of lagged values and the necessity to use instruments. 
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negative impact of exports to high-wage countries on the wage share, but no significant effect 
of exports to the rest of the world. Furthermore, we find a positive impact of union density, 
which captures the direct bargaining power impact. Capital intensity is not significant with a 
positive coefficient, indicating an elasticity between capital and labour that is close to or 
smaller than one. This has two interesting consequences: First, it reinforces the interpretation 
that the effect of intermediate exports reflects the impact of globalisation on the bargaining 
power of labour. If intermediate exports capture the effect of trade-induced technological 
change, a low elasticity of substitution would suggest a positive impact on the wage share. 
Consequently, our finding of a negative effect of exports suggests that the bargaining effect 
outweighs a potential positive technology effect. Second, it casts doubt on the hypothesis that 
a decline in the relative price of capital was the main driver of the decline in the wage share. 
Specification (2-3) report estimations for manufacturing and service sectors separately. Results 
in specification (2) indicate that the effect of exports is driven by manufacturing sectors.8 In 
services, based on Specification (3), we find a positive and significant effect of capital intensity 
(based on the sum of the lagged and contemporaneous variables), which provides evidence for 
an elasticity of substitution of lower than one. Union density has a significant positive effect in 
manufacturing, and it also has a positive effect, albeit borderline insignificant, in services, 
suggesting that unions can improve the wage share in both sector groups.  
Specification (4) includes an interaction term between exports to high-wage countries 
and the capital-output ratio. This controls for the hypothesis that trade within global value 
chains has led to a decline in the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the 
emerging economies, and thereby lowered the wage share. However, we do not find evidence 
for this mechanism as the variable is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, albeit 
                                                 
8 Restricting our sample to manufacturing sectors only also improves the value of the Hansen test, confirming the 
validity of our instruments 
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insignificant, the sign is negative, suggesting that the elasticity is higher in sectors which are 
strongly exposed to global value chains.  
Next, we extend our estimations to 2009, the last year of our sample in specification 
(5), thereby including the first two years of the Great Recession. Only union density remains 
to be significant, which confirms the upmost relevance of bargaining power for the wage share. 
As two years of extremely different labour market conditions during the Great Recession may 
distort the effect of underlying determinants of income distribution, in the rest of the section, 
we report results only for the pre-crisis period. 
Estimations for different skill-groups in manufacturing for the period of 1997-2007 
separately, as reported in specifications (6-8), indicate that exports and union density affect 
medium- and high-skilled workers alike, while growth is the only statistically significant 
variable for low-skilled workers.9 This finding is more in line with traditional trade theory 
based on Heckscher-Ohlin – Stolper-Samuelson – assuming relative scarcity of skilled labour 
in the emerging economies – than with the new trade theory of skill-biased trade induced 
technological change of Feenstra and Hanson (1997) that predict that high-skilled workers will 
gain, and unskilled workers will lose  in both developed and developing countries.  
Table 2 reports results for the other dimension of globalisation: intra-industry 
intermediate imports (narrow offshoring), other imports and FDI, estimated for all sectors as 
well as manufacturing and services separately.  
  
                                                 
9 However, results can only be seen as indicative due to the low p-value of the Hansen test. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for medium-skilled workers turns insignificant if we control for shifts in labour supply, by including 
the share of medium skilled-workers in total labour force, defined as the share of the labour force that has attained 
up to Post-secondary education. Nevertheless, results must be interpreted with caution, because of potential 
measurement issues related to informal employment.  
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Table 2: The effect of offshoring and FDI on the wage share 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sector group Total Manu Services Manu Total Total Total 
growth -0.278** -0.154 -0.048 -0.115 -0.671* 0.017 -0.301* 
  (0.028) (0.125) (0.589) (0.161) (0.093) (0.937) (0.094) 
Capital_Intensity -0.042 -0.033 0.089 -0.028 
  
0.222 
  (0.456) (0.641) (0.319) (0.707) 
  
(0.141) 
Capital_Intensity_(t-1) 
  
 
 
0.119 -0.173 
 
  
  
 
 
(0.254) (0.130) 
 
offshoring _LW 0.089 0.076 32.930** 0.188 
   
  (0.885) (0.881) (0.028) (0.732) 
   
offshoring _HW -0.300 
 
 
    
  (0.612) 
 
 
    
offshoring _HW_(t-1) 
 
0.365 -13.947*** 0.543 
   
  
 
(0.554) (0.002) (0.436) 
   
final_imports 
  
 0.008 
   
   
 (0.931) 
   
Inward_FDI 
  
 
 
0.166 
  
  
  
 
 
(0.458) 
  
Inward_FDI_(t-1) 
  
 
  
-0.001 
 
  
  
 
  
(0.997) 
 
Outward_FDI 
  
 
 
-2.265 
 
1.414 
  
  
 
 
(0.686) 
 
(0.686) 
union_density 
 
0.051  0.049 
 
0.026 1.015 
  
 
(0.264)  (0.348) 
 
(0.916) (0.658) 
union_density_(t-1) 0.227** 
 
0.239** 
 
12.682*** 
  
  (0.030) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.005) 
  
Wage_Share_(t-1) 0.367*** 0.450* 0.746*** 0.519** 0.780 -0.098 0.852** 
  (0.004) (0.075) (0.001) (0.026) (0.145) (0.864) (0.023) 
Wage_Share_(t-2) 0.099 -0.011  -0.041 0.220 
  
 
(0.154) (0.918)  (0.654) (0.501) 
  
Hansen_pval 0.066 0.047 0.950 0.065 0.932 0.345 0.815 
AR1_pval 0.003 0.085 0.022 0.050 0.103 0.873 0.130 
AR2_pval 0.492 0.304 0.273 0.191 0.356 0.596 0.410 
Instruments 31 31 32 35 20 20 19 
Sectors 141 89 52 89 23 45 23 
F-test 8.804 4.616 16.546 6.683 4.981 4.012 10.300 
Observations 1266 790 481 790 107 338 114 
Period 98-07 98-07 97-07 98-07 98-07 97-07 97-07 
Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ with 
one instrument column per variable. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hansen_pval is the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. 
Sectors, F-test and Observations are the number of cross sections, the F-test statistic and the number of 
observations. 
 
Offshoring is insignificant for the total pool of sectors as well as in manufacturing 
(specification 1-2). However, offshoring to high-wage countries has a negative impact on the 
wage share in services, while offshoring to low-wage countries has a positive effect 
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(specification 3). Offshoring is generally higher in high-skilled sectors, suggesting that the 
effect might be driven by multinationals with headquarters in high-wage countries.  
We also include imports of consumption and capital goods (final imports) in 
specification (4), as these products might substitute domestic production and thereby contribute 
to a decline in the wage share. However, we do not find a statistically significant effect. We 
also tested the robustness of the results using final imports by supply country, differentiating 
between imports from high-wage and low-wage countries, with no significant results. With 
respect to the control variables, we confirm the positive impact of union density in 
specifications (1) and (3), while capital intensity is insignificant. Growth exhibits the expected 
negative sign in all specifications, although it is only significant for the estimation including 
all sectors.  
Next, we test for the impact of FDI on the wage share. We differentiate between 
outward and inward FDI, however, the data availability at the sector level is limited. Outward 
FDI data is only available for Korea and Turkey, while we can include Mexico in estimations 
with Inward FDI only. Furthermore, many data points are missing due to data protection issues. 
While we find no significant effect of this variable in any of our estimations, the results can 
only be considered indicative given the data quality and the limited number of cross-sections, 
which additionally casts doubt on the applicability of the GMM estimator which was conceived 
for large panels. Again, we find a significant impact of union density in specification (5). 
Out of the different measures of globalisation, intra-industry exports have the most 
robust effect on the wage share, in line with theories emphasising the effect of global value 
chain participation. Therefore, Table 3 includes additional variables mentioned in section 2 to 
our baseline specification (2) in Table (1) – i.e. for manufacturing sectors only.  
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Table 3: The effect of other control variables 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
growth -0.098 -0.101 -0.138 -0.129 -0.125 -0.105*** -0.041  
(0.297) (0.244) (0.147) (0.129) (0.322) (0.007) (0.426) 
Capital_Intensity_(t-1) 0.048 0.033 0.026 0.021 0.048 0.005 0.025  
(0.271) (0.510) (0.639) (0.693) (0.301) (0.881) (0.508) 
exports_LW_(t-1) -0.598  -0.900 -0.921 -0.587 -0.605 -0.639 
 (0.217)  (0.151) (0.116) (0.263) (0.261) (0.262) 
exports_HW_(t-1) -0.760* 
 
-0.083 -0.044 -0.617* -0.674* -0.631*  
(0.072) 
 
(0.813) (0.899) (0.073) (0.063) (0.089) 
union_density_(t-1) 0.216* 0.113 0.102 0.079 0.186* 0.245** 0.175  
(0.056) (0.232) (0.319) (0.444) (0.077) (0.023) (0.118) 
Wage_Share_(t-1) 0.423* 0.511** 0.418 0.414 0.461** 0.573*** 0.442**  
(0.092) (0.031) (0.106) (0.104) (0.035) (0.000) (0.038) 
Wage_Share_(t-2) 0.042 -0.027 0.009 0.015 0.024 0.002 0.051  
(0.612) (0.765) (0.921) (0.861) (0.749) (0.982) (0.590) 
currency_crisis -0.017 
   
 
  
 
(0.250) 
   
 
  
total_exports_HW_(t-1) 
 
0.009 
  
 
  
  
(0.947) 
  
 
  
total_exports_LW_(t-1) 
 
-0.251 
  
 
  
  
(0.456) 
  
 
  
non-FDI positions 
  
-0.040* 
 
 
  
   
(0.060) 
 
 
  
financial globalisation 
   
-0.045*  
  
    
(0.050)  
  
financial development     -0.752   
     (0.434)   
Gini_net 
    
 -0.001 
 
     
 (0.647) 
 
LMI 
    
 
 
-0.022      
 
 
(0.762) 
Hansen_pval 0.094 0.016 0.042 0.043 0.148 0.022 0.026 
AR1_pval 0.092 0.028 0.045 0.049 0.019 0.001 0.075 
AR2_pval 0.182 0.112 0.306 0.305 0.206 0.154 0.162 
Instruments 32 31 32 32 35 35 32 
Sectors 89 89 76 76 89 89 89 
F-test 5.479 5.239 4.011 4.204 4.988 10.461 7.400 
Observations 777 777 681 681 777 777 777 
Period 98-07 98-07 98-07 98-07 98-07 98-07 98-07 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted wage share. Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ with 
one instrument column per variable. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hansen_pval is the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2_pval is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. 
Sectors, F-test and Observations are the number of cross sections, the F-test statistic and the number of 
observations. 
 
Specification (1) in Table 3 includes a dummy for exchange rate crises which is equal to one 
in years when the country experienced a rate of depreciation in the nominal exchange rate (local 
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currency/dollar) that exceed 25 percent as suggested by Diwan (2001). We find no significant 
effect on the wage share, while exports to high-wage countries and union density remain robust.  
Specification (2) replaces intra-industry intermediate exports with total exports, i.e. 
including exports of capital and final goods. We find no significant effect of this broad measure 
of exports. This suggests that the negative effect on wages is induced through global value 
chains rather than general trade openness. 
Specifications (3-4) control for the (logarithm) of non-FDI foreign assets plus liabilities 
(non-FDI positions) and the (logarithm) of total foreign assets plus liabilities (financial 
globalisation), both measured as a ratio to GDP at the country level. Notably, both variables 
have the expected negative sign, while exports turn statistically insignificant, pointing toward 
a high relevance of financial flows and stocks, as well as a potential correlation between trade 
and financial integration. While this could suggest that financial openness has an even stronger 
impact on the wage share than trade openness, results can only be seen as indicative since no 
adequate variable is available at the sector level and due to the low value of the Hansen test.  
Specification (5) controls for domestic financial development by including intermediate 
inputs supplied by the Financial Intermediation sector of the home country to other sectors of 
the economy (i.e. it is measured at the sector level). There is some evidence of a negative effect 
of financialization and increased financial activities on the wage share in non-financial 
industries in advanced countries (Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). However, our proxy 
measures the extent to which non-financial companies outsource financial activities to the 
financial sector. This might be an insufficient indicator, because it does not capture an increase 
of financial activities that take place inside the company. Better measures of the impact of 
financialization might be interest and dividend payments as well as non-operating/financial 
incomes of the firms, which are, unfortunately, not available for our sample at either sectoral 
or country level. Specification (6) controls for personal inequality measured by the GINI 
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coefficient after taxes and transfers. Specification (7) controls for labour market institutions by 
including an index measuring a large set of labour laws covering different forms of 
employment (e.g. the right of part-time vs. full-time workers), regulation of working time and 
dismissals, employee representation and the regulation of industrial action (Adams, et al., 
2016). While we do not find any of these variables to have a significant effect on the wage 
share exports and union density are robust to their inclusion. Estimations controlling for 
minimum wages as a ratio to average labour compensation per worker did not yield significant 
results, possibly due to the different institutional context in which they are implemented and 
the fact that comparable data is only available for Korea, Turkey, Brazil and Mexico. We also 
account for the impact of indirect measures of bargaining power by including total government 
consumption in our baseline, but the variable is insignificant. One possible explanation is that 
the measure is too broad to reflect the details of spending essential to the bargaining power of 
labour, such as public spending on social protection or health and education.10    
Summing up, our results suggest that the expansion of global value chains, rather than 
simple trade openness, as well as financial globalisation had a negative impact on the wage 
share. Offshoring in advanced economies puts downward pressure on the wage share in these 
countries (Guschanski and Onaran, 2017), while workers in emerging economies, the 
destination of the offshored tasks, are equally losing out with respect to capital. This result is 
robust when we control for potential channels like the increase in capital intensity. 
Furthermore, our findings casts doubt on the hypotheses that the effect is driven by trade-
induced technological change or a change in the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour. There are three other mechanisms which can provide an explanation: First, integration 
to the global value chains may lead to suppression of wage increases in emerging economies 
as countries attempt to increase their competitiveness in terms of labour costs. Second, vertical 
                                                 
10 The results are available upon request 
29 
integration could increase the market share of the firm, reduce competition and thereby increase 
the mark-up, which the firm is able to charge on unit costs. Alternatively, an increase in 
competitive pressure might make firms less accommodating to wage demands of workers. 
Third, efficiency gains through global value chains may increase profits, which however are 
not shared with labour. All these mechanisms require a weakening of the bargaining power of 
labour due to both institutional changes and increased fall-back options of capital vis-à-vis 
labour in a globalised economy.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Our findings lend strong support to the hypothesis that globalisation decreased the bargaining 
power of labour vis-à-vis capital and contributed to a decline in the wage share in the emerging 
economies. The negative effect works via integration into global value chains and financial 
globalisation rather than through general trade openness. We find evidence of an elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour that is close to unity or lower based on a positive, albeit 
mostly insignificant impact of capital intensity on the wage share. Consequently, if the increase 
in capital intensity in the emerging economies is a result of global value chain participation, 
there should have been a negligible, or even a positive effect on the wage share. We also do 
not find evidence for the hypothesis that strong exposure to global value chains induced a 
decline in the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Our finding can be 
interpreted as an indication that overly technical approaches to income distribution are too 
simplistic, and that institutional and social factors should be given more attention.  
The results suggest that workers have not benefitted as much as capital from the 
efficiency gains of international trade due to the decline in workers’ bargaining power. We find 
evidence that this decline is related to a strong deterioration in union density. Other institutional 
factors such as government expenditure, labour market institutions and financial development 
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were not statistically significant. However, data availability for these measures for emerging 
economies is limited. Firm level data might be a promising direction for further research, in 
particular for shedding light on the impact of further aspects of financial activities, private 
equity funds and shareholder value orientation on the wage share.  
Our findings have important policy implications. Rising inequality is not an inevitable 
outcome of increasing globalisation. Tackling income inequality requires a restructuring of the 
institutional framework in which bargaining takes place and a level playing field where the 
bargaining power of labour is more in balance with that of capital. The impact of globalisation 
is likely to be significantly moderated and/or offset by stronger bargaining power of labour, for 
example via an improvement in the trade union legislation or collective bargaining coverage. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that a simple attempt to reduce income inequality through 
skill-upgrading will not work, as high- and medium-skilled workers have experienced the 
strongest negative impact of globalisation among all workers in the emerging economies. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variable definition Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Source 
wage⁡share =
labour⁡compensation
value⁡added
 
1779 0.4672 0.1794 0.1284 1.0629 
WIOD 
wage⁡share(high_skilled) =
labour⁡compensation(high_skilled)
value⁡added
 
1703 0.1152 0.1108 0.0040 0.7019 
WIOD 
wage⁡share(medium_skilled) =
labour⁡compensation(medium_skilled)
value⁡added
 
1703 0.1947 0.0988 0.0293 0.6301 
WIOD 
wage⁡share(low_skilled) =
labour⁡compensation(low_skilled)
value⁡added
 
1679 0.1587 0.1043 0.0025 0.6635 
WIOD 
Capital⁡Intensity =
Capital⁡Stock
value⁡added
 
1911 1.2154 1.3669 0.0054 8.0322 
WIOD 
growth = ∆ln⁡(real⁡value⁡added) 1804 0.0570 0.1019 -0.7388 0.7086 WIOD 
union⁡density =
union⁡members
total⁡employees
 
1722 0.2706 0.1894 0.0495 0.7362 
ICTWS
S 5.1 
exports⁡high_wage =
intra_industry⁡intermediate⁡exports⁡to⁡high_wage⁡countries⁡
gross⁡output
 
1911 0.0151 0.0249 0 0.2583 
WIOD 
exports⁡low_wage =
intra_industry⁡intermediate⁡exports⁡to⁡the⁡rest⁡of⁡the⁡world
gross⁡output
 
1911 0.0128 0.0255 0 0.2123 
WIOD 
total⁡exports⁡high_wage =
total⁡exports⁡to⁡high_wage⁡countries
gross⁡output
 
1820 0.1186 0.1495 0 0.9473 
WIOD 
total⁡exports⁡low_wage =
total⁡exports⁡to⁡low_wage⁡countries
gross⁡output
 
1820 0.0487 0.0642 0 0.4629 
WIOD 
offshoring⁡high_wage =
offshoring⁡to⁡high_wage⁡countries
gross⁡output
 
1911 0.0201 0.0369 3.67*10-6 0.3473 
WIOD 
offshoring⁡low_wage⁡ =
offshoring⁡to⁡the⁡Rest⁡of⁡the⁡World
gross⁡output
 
1911 0.0119 0.0226 2.04*10-7 0.2408 
WIOD 
final⁡imports⁡ =
imports⁡of⁡capital⁡and⁡consumption⁡goods⁡(by⁡supply⁡sector)
gross⁡output
 
1820 0.0621 0.1511 6.01*10-5 2.0017 WIOD 
37 
FDI⁡outflows
gross⁡output
 
186 0.0035 0.0119 -0.0869 0.0542 
OECD 
FDI⁡inflows
gross⁡output
 
440 0.0170 0.0635 -0.2443 0.7002 
OECD 
financial⁡globalisation =
total⁡foreign⁡assets + total⁡foreign⁡liabilities⁡
GDP
 
1638 0.8134 0.3055 0.3824 2.3867 
Lane, et 
al. 2007 
non_FDI⁡positions =
non_FDI⁡foreign⁡assets + non_FDI⁡foreign⁡liabilities⁡
GDP
 
1638 0.6566 0.2734 0.3471 2.0776 
Lane, et 
al. 2007 
financial development 
1820 0.0252 0.0267 3.04*10-4 0.2583 
WIOD 
Gini coefficient (after taxes and transfers) 
1911 42.4094 6.9029 30.2150 51.4359 
SWIID 
Strictness of labour market institutions 
1911 2.5054 0.3573 1.7321 3.0448 
Adams, 
et al. 
2016 
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Table A2 – Sectoral classification and skill taxonomy 
Description ISIC3 
code  
Skill classification (IMF, 
2007) 
Manufacturing 
  
Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16 low 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 17-19 low 
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20 low 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 21-22 high 
Chemicals and chemical products 24 high 
Rubber and Plastics 25 high 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 high 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
27-28 low 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 high 
Electrical and optical equipment 30-33 high 
Transport equipment 34-35 low 
Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling 36-37 low 
   
Services 
  
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (Utilities) E high 
Construction F low 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
 
low 
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; 
Retail Sale of Fuel 
50 low 
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles 
and Motorcycles 
51 low 
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of 
Household Goods 
52 low 
Hotels and Restaurants H low 
Transport and storage 60-63 high 
Post and Telecommunications 64 high 
Financial Intermediation J high 
Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other Business Activities 71-74 high 
 
